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Abstract. In this paper, we carefully study both distinguishing and key-
recovery attacks against Bluetooth two-level E0 given many short frames.
Based on a flaw in the resynchronization of Bluetooth E0, we are able to fully
exploit the largest bias of the finite state machine inside E0 for our attacks.
Our key-recovery attack works with 240 simple operations given the first 24
bits of 235 frames. Compared with all existing attacks against two-level E0,
this is the best one so far.
1 Background
The short-range wireless technology Bluetooth uses the keystream generator E0 to
produce the keystream for encryption. After the earlier results [10, 9, 6] of correlation
(also called bias) properties inside the Finite State Machine (FSM) towards the
one-level E0, most recently, [12] systematically studied the biases and proved two
previously known large biases to be the only largest up to 26 consecutive bits of
the FSM output sequences. Attacks against E0 mostly focus on one-level E0 only
and the best attacks [12, 1, 5] work on one impractically long frame of keystream
without exception. Nevertheless, a few attacks [15, 11, 7–9] apply to two-level E0;
compared with feasible attack complexities on one-level E0, attack complexities on
two-level E0 are extremely high and make the practical Bluetooth E0 unbroken.
The main contribution of this paper is that first based on one of the two largest
biases inside the FSM within one-level E0, we identify the bias at two-level E0 due
to a resynchronization flaw in Bluetooth E0. Unlike the traditional approach to find
the bias, the characterized bias does not involve the precomputation of the multiple
polynomial with low weight. Second, to utilize the identified bias, we develop a
novel attack to directly recover the original encryption key for two-level E0 without
reconstructing the initial state of E0 at the second level. Our key-recovery attack
works with 240 simple operations given the first 24 bits of 235 frames. Compared
with all existing attacks [15, 11, 7–9] against two-level E0, this is the best so far.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review description
of two-level E0. In Section 3 we study the attack against one-level E0. Then, we
investigate the E0 resynchronization flaw, which allows to develop the basic attack
of previous section into the distinguishing and key-recovery attacks against two-level
E0 in Section 4; we further extend our key-recovery attack in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Core of Bluetooth E0
To briefly outline, the core of E0 (both dashed boxes in Fig. 1) can be viewed
as a nonlinear filtering generator. The filtering generator consists of four LFSRs
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Fig. 1. Diagram of two-level E0 keystream generation
(R1, . . . , R4) which are equivalent to a single L-bit LFSR with connection polyno-
mial1 p(x) and a 4-bit FSM, where L = 128. The keystream bit of the generator
is obtained by xoring the output bit of the regularly-clocked LFSR with that of
the FSM, which takes the current state of the LFSR as input and emits one bit
(denoted by c0t in Bluetooth specification) out of its 4-bit memory.
2.2 Review on Two-level Bluetooth E0
Let Kc be the L-bit secret key computed by the key generation algorithm E3 [3,
p783]. According to [3], the effective key K of length 8` (1 ≤ ` ≤ 16) is computed
by
K(x) = Kc(x) mod g(`)1 (x),
where the polynomial g
(`)
1 (x) is specified in [3, p770] and has degree 8`. Bluetooth
two-level E0 (depicted in Fig. 1) uses two L-bit inputs: one is the known nonce2 P i,
the other is the linearly expanded L-bit key K′
c
from K by K′
c
(x) = g
(`)
2 (x) · K(x),
where the polynomial g
(`)
2 (x) is also specified in [3, p770] and has degree no larger
than L− 8`; or equivalently, we can rewrite it as
K′
c
= E(K), (1)
where E is a linear mapping. After initialization of the equivalent LFSR for the first
level E0, we can express its initial state3 Ri[−199,...,L−200] = (R
i
−199, . . . , R
i
L−200) as
Ri[−199,...,L−200] = G1(K
′
c
)⊕G2(P i), (2)
for i = 1, . . . , m, where G1 and G2 are affine transformations over GF (2)
L. Next
comes the so-called two-level E0:
1 Note that the connection polynomial of the equivalent single LFSR equals the product
of those of the four LFSRs.
2 By convention, hereafter we always use the superscript i to indicate the context of the
i-th frame.
3 Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the unified notation Ωi[a,...,b] with the formatted
subscript to denote the vector (Ωia, . . . , Ω
i
b).
– During the first level, with the FSM initial state preset to zero, E0 runs L
clocks producing 200-bit output Sit = R
i
t ⊕ αit and updating Ri[t,...,t+L−1] by
Ri[t+1,...,t+L] = M(R
i
[t,...,t+L−1]) for t = −199, . . . , 0, where M is the linear
mapping over GF (2)L that corresponds to the companion matrix associated
with p(x). Note that first, αit is the output bit of the FSM fed with R
i
[t,...,t+L−1];
second, the last L-bit output at the first level E0 is Si[1−L,...,0]; last, R
i
[1−L,...,0] =
(M72 ◦G1)(K′c)⊕ (M72 ◦G2)(P i).
– At the beginning of the second level, the equivalent single LFSR is initialized by
V i[1,...,L] = G3(S
i
[1−L,...,0]), where G3 : GF (2)
128 → GF (2)128 is another affine
transformation (see [3, p772]); the FSM initial state at the second level remains
the same as the one in the end of the first level. Note that the present time is
t = 1.
– During the second level, for t = 1, . . . , 2745, E0 produces the keystream zit =
V it ⊕βit for encryption of the i-th frame and updates V i[t,...,t+L−1] by V i[t+1,...,t+L].
2.3 An Important Note on G3
We observe that G3 is implemented in such a simple way
4 that the last L-bit output
sequence of the first level E0 is byte-wise reloaded into the four component LFSRs
in parallel at the second level E0 with only a few exceptions, which turns out to be
a flaw as introduced later in Section 4. For completeness, Table 1 lists in time order
the first 24 output bits of R1, . . . , R4 individually at the beginning of E0 level two,
in terms of the L-bit input v0, . . . , vL−1.
Table 1. The first 24 output bits of LFSRs at E0 level two
LFSR output bits
R1 v71 · · · v64, v39 · · · v32, v7 · · · v0
R2 v79 · · · v72, v47 · · · v40, v15 · · · v8
R3 v111 · · · v104, v87 · · · v80, v55 · · · v48
R4 v119 · · · v112, v95 · · · v88, v63 · · · v56
2.4 The Bias inside the FSM
Our starting point would be the bias inside the FSM, which was discovered by [9,
6] and further proved in [12] to be the the largest bias up to 26-bit output sequence
of the FSM involving the smallest number of consecutive bits. Let λ = 25256 , we have
Pr(c0t ⊕ c0t+1 ⊕ c0t+2 ⊕ c0t+3 ⊕ c0t+4 = 1) =
1
2
+
λ
2
,
for any integer t, assuming that the L + 4 = 132-bit initial state of E0 is random
and uniformly distributed. Hereafter, we analyze as exactly described in Bluetooth
specification [3]. For convenience, we denote c0t used for the first and second level
keystream generation by αit, β
i
t respectively. Therefore {αit}, {βit} being separated
sequences of {c0t} both satisfy the same statistical property:
Pr(αit ⊕ αit+1 ⊕ αit+2 ⊕ αit+3 ⊕ αit+4 = 1) =
1
2
+
λ
2
, (3)
Pr(βit ⊕ βit+1 ⊕ βit+2 ⊕ βit+3 ⊕ βit+4 = 1) =
1
2
+
λ
2
, (4)
4 It is believed to help increase the rate of keystream generation.
for any t and any i.
3 Security Analysis on E0 Level One
The goal of the attacker in this section is to recover the effective 8`-bit encryption
key K with knowledge of m L-bit output sequences Si[1−L,...,0] of the first level E0
for i = 1, . . . , m and the corresponding m nonces P 1, . . . , P m.
3.1 Finding the Closest Sequences with Fixed Differences
We begin with a very simple problem: given 2m L-bit sequences s1, . . . , sm and
δ1, . . . , δm, where δ1 = 0 and δi 6= δj for all i 6= j, find the L-bit sequence r1 that
maximizes N(r1) =
∑m
i=1
∑L
t=1(s
i
t ⊕ rit) where rit = r1t ⊕ δit for i = 1, . . . , m and
t = 1, . . . , L.
Similar to the well-known approach (see [9, p251]), the solution based on the
idea of minority vote goes fairly easy. We have
N(r1) =
L∑
t=1
m∑
i=1
(sit ⊕ r1t ⊕ δit).
Thus, in order to maximize N(r1), we must have
r1t = minority{sit ⊕ δit : i = 1, . . . , m}
for all t = 1, . . . , L. Note that in case of a tie for r1t , we have two answers for this t-th
bit regardless of all the other bits. We finally obtain all the answers that achieve the
same maximal N(r1). The time and memory complexities of the above algorithm
both equal the data complexity O(mL).
3.2 Attack against E0 Level One
Let ∆i[1−L,...,0] = R
1
[1−L,...,0] ⊕ Ri[1−L,...,0] for i = 1, . . . , m. By Eq.(2) we have
∆i[1−L,...,0] = (M
72 ◦G2)(P 1 ⊕ P i). We further set
rit =
4⊕
j=0
Rit+j ,
δit =
4⊕
j=0
∆it+j ,
sit =
4⊕
j=0
Sit+j ,
for i = 1, . . . , m and t = 1− L, . . . ,−4. Note that sit ⊕ rit =
⊕4
j=0 α
i
t+j follows the
biased distribution by Eq.(3). As long as
∑m
i=1
∑−4
t=1−L(s
i
t⊕ rit) is the maximal and
∆it, S
i
t are known, we can apply the preceding algorithm to recover (L− 4) bits of
r1 followed by an exhaustive search on the remaining 4 bits, next solve R1, then
K′
c
by Eq.(2), and finally deduce K from K′
c
by Eq.(1). The time/memory/data
complexities all equal O(mL+24L), i.e. O((m+16)L). No precomputation is needed.
About the minimal m to guarantee the valid precondition
∑m
i=1
∑−4
t=1−L(s
i
t⊕rit)
is the maximal, we use the result in [12, Eq.(10)] based on [2] that says regardless
of the value of L and `, we need the minimum
m ≈ 4 log 2
λ2
(frames). (5)
Consequently, we require m = 512 to recover K from S i and P i for i = 1, . . . , m.
This results in the time/data/memory complexities all the same as O(216). To
verify this, we ran experiments on 512 frames of the randomly-chosen 132-bit E0
initial state 225 times. It turned out that we had 1.5 errors and 0.4 tie in average,
which means we can easily correct all errors by an extra checking step in the end
in negligible time. Finally, Table 2 compares our result with the only known5 four
attacks [7, 8, 11, 15] working on frames of L-bit consecutive keystreams. Note that
existing attacks [7, 8, 11, 15] directly apply to two-level E0 as well with the level-by-
level key-recovery scheme6; in contrast, our attack is completely disabled against
two-level E0 with this scheme as the attack is based on a naive assumption that
we directly observe the output of E0 level one7. In the next section, we introduce
a resynchronization flaw in Bluetooth E0 that leads to a shortcut extended attack
against the two-level E0.
Table 2. Comparison of our attack with existing attacks against E0 level one given frames
of L bits
Attack Type Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
Divide & Conquer [15] - 293 1 27 -
BDD [11] - 277 1 27 -
Algebraic Attack [7] - 251 2 28 251
Algebraic Attack [8] - 223.4 3 28.6 223.4
Our Correlation Attack - 216 29 216 216
4 Security Analysis on Two-level E0
4.1 The resynchronization Flaw in Bluetooth Two-level E0
Define
U i = (U i1, . . . , U
i
L) = G3(R
i
[1−L,...,0]). (6)
Following the description of G3 in Subsection 2.3, we can easily verify that
V it = U
i
t ⊕ αi−56−t ⊕ αi−48−t ⊕ αi−16−t ⊕ αi−8−t, for t = 1, . . . , 8,
V it = U
i
t ⊕ αi−80−t ⊕ αi−72−t ⊕ αi−32−t ⊕ αi−24−t, for t = 9, . . . , 16,
V it = U
i
t ⊕ αi−104−t ⊕ αi−96−t ⊕ αi−56−t ⊕ αi−48−t, for t = 17, . . . , 24.
From the above equations, we summarize the characteristics of V it by
V it = U
i
t ⊕ αiat ⊕ αiat+8 ⊕ αibt ⊕ αibt+8, (7)
for t = 1, . . . , 24, where at = −t + constb t−18 c and bt = −t + const
′
b t−18 c
. Note that
Eq.(7) is our crucial observation about Bluetooth E0 resynchronization flaw which
5 In the similar approached paper [9], m is chosen as 45 for E0 level one without the
complexity estimate, because the authors focused on the two-level E0 and traded m
with the time complexity of E0 level one, whose time complexity is negligible with that
of the E0 level two.
6 namely, the initial state at the first level is reconstructed after the initial state at the
second level is recovered
7 As a matter of fact, according to [3, p763], Bluetooth takes the correlation properties
into account and adopts the two-level scheme of keystream generation in practice on
purpose.
enables a shortcut attack throughout the two levels of E0. Now, we express the
output bit zit of the second level E0 keystream by
zit = U
i
t ⊕ αiat ⊕ αiat+8 ⊕ αibt ⊕ αibt+8 ⊕ βit , (8)
for t = 1, . . . , 24. Let uit =
⊕4
j=0 U
i
t+j and s
i
t =
⊕4
j=0 z
i
t+j . From Eq.(8), we have
that
sit ⊕ uit =
4⊕
j=0
αiat−j ⊕
4⊕
j=0
αiat−j+8 ⊕
4⊕
j=0
αibt−j ⊕
4⊕
j=0
αibt−j+8 ⊕
4⊕
j=0
βit+j (9)
for t = 8k+1, . . . , 8k+4, k = 0, 1, 2. Therefore, we deduce an important correlation
concerning the practical implementation of E0 from Eq.(3,4,9):
Theorem 1. Assuming independence of αit’s and β
i
t’s, we have
Pr(sit ⊕ uit = 1) =
1
2
+
λ5
2
for t = 8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 4, k = 0, 1, 2.
4.2 A Near-practical Distinguishing Attack against Two-level E0
Using the standard technique of linear cryptanalysis, we expect that sit ⊕ uit equals
one most of the time for t = 8k +1, . . . , 8k +4, k = 0, 1, 2 with a total of λ−10 ≈ 234
samples. Since the difference
U i ⊕ U j = G3(Ri[1−L,...,0])⊕G3(Rj[1−L,...,0]) = (G3 ◦M72 ◦G2)(P i ⊕ P j),
is known for all i and j by Eq.(2,6), we apply the algorithm in Subsection 3.2 to
recover the bit u11 separately with two sets of 2
34 frames sharing only one common
frame denoted as the first frame for both sets. If we get a unique solution, we
conclude the keystreams are generated by E0; otherwise, we accept them as truly
random sources. The time/data complexities are O(2 × 234 × 5), i.e. O(237). In
contrast to the conventional treatment based on finding a multiple polynomial with
low weight, no precomputation is needed in our scenario. So far, this is the only
known near-practical attack against the full two-level E0. We can further improve
the distinguisher by recovering u1t for t = 1, . . . , 4 with two different sets of frames
of the first 8 bits. Comparing two sets of solutions for the four bits, if we get a
majority of identical bits, then we conclude the keystreams are generated by E0,
otherwise we accept them as truly random sources. The number of frames we need
is 2× 234/4 = 233. This results in time/data complexities O(233 × 8), i.e. O(236).
4.3 The Key-recovery Attack against Two-level E0
From last subsection and Theorem 1, we know that with 234 frames of keystreams,
we can recover twelve bits, i.e. u1t for t = 8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 4, k = 0, 1, 2. After that,
we try exhaustively for the remaining |K| − 12 bits assuming linear independency
of the twelve bits8. Note that we have
U i = (G3 ◦M72 ◦G1)(K′c)⊕ (G3 ◦M72 ◦G2)(P i), (10)
8 We tested and found that the twelve bits are linearly independent for all choices of
effective keylength |K| = 8` except for |K| = 8 in which case our attack is worse than
the brute force attack and becomes meaningless anyway.
by Eq.(6,2). So, we deduce from Eq.(10,1) that
U i = (G3 ◦M72 ◦G1 ◦E)(K)⊕ (G3 ◦M72 ◦G2)(P i),
which means U i is an affine transformation of K given P i and so is ui. Thus, we
can ultimately solve the effective key K from ui. The total time complexity of our
attack is computed as
234 + 2|K|−13 =
{
234, |K| < 48
2|K|−13, |K| ≥ 48
The data complexity of our attack is (234 − 1) · 24 + 128, i.e. O(238.6), as we need
234 − 1 frames of the first 24 bits plus one frame of 128 bits. Table 3 compares our
attack with existing attacks [15, 11, 7–9] against the two-level Bluetooth E0. Note
that the number of required frames completely depends on the frame size in [7]
to meet the requirement of data amount. This is, to our best knowledge, the first
non-trivial9 attack against practical E0 with various key length. Notice that when
40 ≤ |K| ≤ 80, our attack offers the best performance over the others.
Table 3. Comparison of our attack with existing attacks against two-level Bluetooth E0
Attack Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
exhaustive search - 2|K|−1 1 |K| -
[15] - 293 1 27 -
[11] - 2113 1 27 -
[7] - 273 - 243 251
[8] 280 265 2 212.4 280
[9] 280 270 45 217 280
Our Attack - 2|K|−13 + 234 234 238.6 234
Remark 2. Note that our attack is based on one of the largest two (linearly depen-
dent) biases which is introduced in Eq.(3). As time/data tradeoff, we might also
expect to have some other linearly independent biases to be large enough so that
the time is decreased at somewhat reasonably increasing cost of data/memory com-
plexities. Nonetheless, using the computation formula of [12], we find none such bias
that leads to the data complexity of less than 250.
Remark 3. As the nonces P i’s are affine transformation of a 26-bit clock and a mas-
ter device address, our attack requiring much more than 226 frames of keystreams
still remains impractical unfortunately.
5 Extended Key-recovery Attack against Two-level E0
5.1 A Partial Key-recovery Attack
Notice that on one hand, each of the four leftmost biased bits on the right-hand
side of Eq.(9) is computed only with a certain subset of fixed key bits, the known
nonce and the unknown variable FSM initial state; on the other hand, the value
of Eq.(9) can be easily predetermined from the left-hand side, after we recover uit’s
with 234 frames by the distinguisher in Subsection 4.2. Consequently, the well-known
technique of statistical cryptanalysis leads us to the following approach to advance
9 in contrast to the brute force attack
our key-recovery attack: supposing we manage to guess one of those four biased bits
for all frames by guessing only the related key bits, then, for each frame, we XOR
the guess on the biased bit with the predetermined value of Eq.(9) to obtain one bit.
Thanks to Eq.(9), this bit shows bias for the right guess and almost balancedness
for the wrong guess (which is also called statistical distinguishable); we’re able to
spot out the right guess of all guesses finally.
FSM
R1
R2
R3
R4
αatRat
Rat−2,
Rat−1,
αat−2,
αat−1,
Sat−2, Sat−1, Sat
Fig. 2. Computation diagram of Sat−2, Sat−1, Sat
More specifically, we observe two important points about E0 FSM state: first,
the FSM state at time t always contains the two bits c0t , c
0
t−1; second, the 4-bit
FSM state is updated by its current state together with four current output bits
of LFSRs. Therefore, for fixed t ∈ {8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 4} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the bit10⊕4
j=0 α
i
at−j
computed from 5 consecutive bits αiat , . . . , α
i
at−4, is derived from the
same subset of 4× 3 = 12 bits of the shared key K in all frames given P i together
with the unknown frame-dependent FSM state at time at − 3 (see Fig. 2). We can
compute all the possible sequences11 α′at , . . . , α
′
at−2 in according to every possible
FSM state for each frame i with t ∈ {8k+1, . . . , 8k+4} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Within one
frame, of all the choices of 12-bit K ′ of K and the FSM state, the sequence computed
with the right shared 12-bit K and the right FSM state yields
⊕4
j=0 α
i
at−j , which
equals
⊕4
j=0(α
i
at−j+8
⊕ αibt−j ⊕ αibt−j+8 ⊕ βit+j) with bias λ4 when xoring with
the computable bit sit ⊕ uit by Eq.(9); meanwhile, the sequence obtained with the
wrong FSM state and/or the wrong shared 12-bit K ′ is expected to produce a new
biased bit
⊕4
j=0 α
′
at−j
(with bias λ) which when xoring with sit⊕uit finally generates
a bit with much smaller bias λ6 that could be approximated by a randomly and
uniformly distributed bit. Therefore, we estimate that for every frame, the 12-bit
guess K ′ would yield 24 randomly and uniformly distributed bits, except for the
correct guess that produces 24− 1 = 15 randomly and uniformly distributed bits as
well as one biased bit (with bias λ4).
Alternatively, for every frame i, we can guess 4(2+τ) bits K ′ of K together with
the FSM state at time at − τ − 2 to compute consecutively τ bits
⊕4
j=0 α
′
at−j , . . .,
10 For our convenience, we discuss the first biased bit on the right-hand side of Eq.(9) from
now on; however, due to symmetry of the subscripts on the right-hand side of Eq.(9),
our discussion also applies to the other three biased bits but the last.
11 We omit the superscript i and use α′t to denote the candidate for α
i
t.
⊕4
j=0 α
′
at−j−τ+1
with τ ≤ 5 − (t mod 8) for fixed t ∈ {8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 4} and
k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Denote the parameter m as the required number of frames to be
discussed later. For the same reason as before, when we xor the τ bits with sit ⊕
uit, . . . , s
i
t+τ−1⊕uit+τ−1, we expect the 16m sequences to comply with a truly random
distribution D0 of τ -bit vectors for all wrong guesses K ′, and the 16m sequences
for the right guess K to comply with the biased distribution D1 of τ -bit vectors
approximated by
D1 ≈ D
′ + 15D0
16
, (11)
where D′ def= D⊗4 with ⊗ representing the regular convolutional product (see [12]),
andD is the distribution of⊕4j=0 c0t−j , . . . ,⊕4j=0 c0t−τ−j+1. Note that Eq.(11) means
all the biases in D′ dwindles 16 times in D1, i.e. we have the following relation
between the two Walsh coefficients Dˆ1(x), Dˆ′(x) of any nonzero τ -bit vector x:
Dˆ1(x) = 1
16
Dˆ′(x). (12)
Let f : GF (2)τ → R be a weighted grade for those resultant sequences χ1K′ , . . . , χ16mK′
from the guess K ′. We accordingly grade each guess K ′ by
GK′ =
16m∑
j=1
f(χjK′). (13)
Using analysis of [16] and [2] (see Appendix for complete treatment), we show that
with minimal
m ≈ τ + 2
2τ − 1 · 2
34.5,
the score GK of the right guess tops the chart by choosing f(x) = D1(x)− 116 for all
x ∈ GF (2)τ . Note that with f(x) = D′(x) we obtain equivalently the same resultant
score GK′ for all K
′. Also, recall that to predetermine uit, . . . , u
i
t+τ−1 we need 2
34
frames for the distinguisher. Thus we must have
m ≈ max
(
234,
τ + 2
2τ − 1 · 2
34.5
)
. (14)
Algorithm 1 details the above partial key-recovery attack for 4(2 + τ) bits.
5.2 Complexities and Optimization Issues
About the performance of the partial key-recovery attack, it is seen from Algo-
rithm 1 that to recover 4(2+τ) bits, it runs 24(2+τ) ·m ·24(2+τ) = m(2+τ) ·212+4τ
times to compute each α′t for grading 2
4(2+τ) candidates. In total, we have to per-
form T = m(2 + τ) · 212+4τ operations, where m is set by Eq.(14).
Additionally, the loop from Line 9 to Line 15 can be done by one operation
after precomputation as detailed below, which makes T = m · 24(2+τ). During pre-
processing, we run through every yat−1, . . . , yat−τ−2 (where yt denotes the Ham-
ming weight of the original four component LFSRs’ output bits at time t) to
compute the 24 possible sequences α′at , . . . , α
′
at−τ−1 which yield 2
4 sequences b′ =⊕4
j=0 α
′
at−j , . . . ,
⊕4
j=0 α
′
at−j−τ+1 accordingly; and then for each τ -bit b
′′, we incre-
ment the counter µb
′′
b′⊕b′′ ; last, we build up a table to store h(yat−1, . . . , yat−τ−2; b
′′) =∑
b′ µ
b′′
b′⊕b′′(D1(b′⊕b′′)− 116 ). The precomputation needs memory 2τ ·52+τ ≈ 23.32τ+4.6
and time 24 · 52+τ · (2 + τ) · 2τ ≈ (τ + 2)23.32τ+8.6. After that, in real-time process-
ing, for each frame i, we just compute bi
′′
= bi
′′
0 , . . . , b
i′′
τ−1 with b
i′′
n = u
i
t+n ⊕ sit+n
Algorithm 1 The extended attack against two-level E0 to recover 4(2 + τ) bits
Parameters:
1: D1 by Eq.(11)
2: τ ∈ [1, 4]
3: m by Eq.(14)
Input:
4: keystreams zi1 · · · z
i
24 generated by the same K together with P
i under two-level E0 for
i = 1, . . . , m
Processing:
5: choose k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t ∈ {8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 4} with τ ≤ 5 − (t mod 8)
6: for 4(2+τ ) bits K ′ of K that are used to compute α′at−τ−1, . . . , α
′
at and are consistent
with previously recovered bits do
7: initialize GK′ to zero
8: for i = 1, . . . , m do
9: initialize counters µ0, µ1, . . . , µ2τ−1 to zero
10: for all 4-bit FSM state at time at − τ − 2 do
11: compute α′at−τ−1, . . . , α
′
at
12: compute b = b0, . . . , bτ−1 with bn = u
i
t+n ⊕ s
i
t+n ⊕
L4
j=0 α
′
at−j−n
13: increment µb
14: end for
15: increment GK′ by
P
b
µb(D1(b)−
1
16
)
16: end for
17: add the pair (GK′ , K
′) into the list
18: end for
19: find the largest GK in the list and output K
for n = 0, . . . , τ − 1, deduce yiat−1, . . . , yiat−τ−2 from K ′, P i and increment GK′ by
h(yiat−1, . . . , y
i
at−τ−2; b
i′′). Thus, we get T = m · 24(2+τ).
Moreover, when 24(2+τ) · 2τ ≤ m, i.e. 28+5τ ≤ m, we can further reduce T
down to m + 216+9τ . Notice that it is the same subset of 4(2 + τ)-bit Ωi of P i
that is used to compute yi = (yiat−1, . . . , y
i
at−τ−2) with K
′. For convenience, let
g : GF (2)L → GF (2)4(2+τ) map P i to Ωi. We precompute a table h′(Ω, q) for
every 4(2 + τ)-bit Ω and τ -bit q defined by:
h′(Ω, q) =
m∑
i=1
1Ω=g(P i),q=ui
t
⊕si
t
with ui = (uit, . . . , u
i
t+τ−1) and s
i = (sit, . . . , s
i
t+τ−1). This takes time O(m) with
memory O(28+5τ ). Recall that ui is determined independent of K ′ by the distin-
guisher in Subsection 4.2, and ui, si, yi completely determine how to increment GK′
for frame i, i.e. by h(yi; ui ⊕ si) from last paragraph. So, in real-time process-
ing, for every K ′, instead of processing frame by frame to update GK′ , we simply
go through every (8 + 5τ)-bit pair (Ω, q), deduce y = (yat−1, . . . , yat−τ−2) from
Ω and K ′, then increment GK′ by h
′(Ω, q)h(y; q). We reach the time complexity
T = m + 24(2+τ) · 28+5τ = m + 216+9τ for 28+5τ ≤ m.
To summarize, we have T = m + 24(2+τ) ·min(m, 28+5τ ). Table 4 lists the best
complexities of our partial key-recovery attack corresponding to τ = 1, . . . , 4. Note
that the success probability of the attack in the table is estimated according to
the hypothesis test result of Eq.(11), i.e. the percentage of the 4(2 + τ)-bit keys to
generate a non-uniformly distributed sequence α′at−τ−3, . . . , α
′
at
with all the possible
FSM state.
Table 4. Performance of our partial key-recovery attack against two-level E0
Frames Time Prob. of recovered key bits
τ m T Success 4(2 + τ )
1 236 236 50.8% 12
2 235 235 87.0% 16
3 234.5 243 99.0% 20
4 234.3 252 99.9% 24
5.3 The Overall Key-recovery Attack
Now we discuss how we proceed with the optimized Algorithm 1 to recover the
full K. With τ = 2 and fixed k, we independently run Algorithm 1 three times
with t = 8k + 1, . . . , 8k + 3. And we expect at least two successes out of three
runs. After checking consistency of all the overlapping bits for every possible pair of
the algorithm outputs, we identify all the successful runs and obtain the minimum
16 + 4 = 20 key bits.
We can easily adjust Algorithm 1 to target at any of the middle three biased
bits on the right-hand side of Eq.(9) to recover 16 bits. With each modified partial
key-recovery algorithm, we repeat previous procedure to recover minimum 20 bits.
In total, we are sure to gather 4 × 20 = 80 bits. Since we already have 12 bits by
the distinguisher, we finally exhaustively search the remaining L−80−12 = 36 bits
within one frame. Algorithm 2 gives the abstract strategy of our complete attack.
Therefore, to recover L-bit K, our key-recovery attack works on m = 235 frames, in
time 24m + 4× 3× 235 ≈ 240. The comparison of our attack with the best known
attacks [7–9] against two-level E0 for |K| = L is available in Table 5.
Algorithm 2 The abstract of the complete attack against two-level E0 for |K| = L
Parameters:
1: m by Eq.(14)
Input:
2: m frames of 24-bit keystreams generated by the same K together with known nonces
under two-level E0
Processing:
3: for each of the leftmost four biased bits on right-hand side of Eq.(9) do
4: choose k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and set τ = 2
5: for t = 8k + 1, 8k + 2, 8k + 3 do
6: use the optimized partial key-recovery attack to obtain 16 bits
7: end for
8: checking consistency among pairs of those 16 bits to obtain minimum 20-bit K
9: end for
10: exhaustively search the remaining 36 key bits within one frame
11: output the L-bit K
6 Conclusion
In this paper, based on one of the two largest biases inside the FSM within one-level
E0, for the first time, we identify the bias at two-level E0 due to a resynchroniza-
tion flaw in Bluetooth E0. Unlike the traditional approach to find the bias, the
characterized bias does not involve the precomputation of the multiple polynomial
Table 5. Comparison of our attack with the best attacks [7–9] against two-level E0 for
|K| = L
Attack Precomputation Time Frames Data Memory
[7] - 273 - 243 251
[8] 280 265 2 212.4 280
[9] 280 270 45 217 280
Our Attack - 240 235 239.6 235
with low weight. Second, to utilize the identified bias, we develop a novel attack to
directly recover the original encryption key for two-level E0 without reconstructing
the initial state of E0 at the second level. Our key-recovery attack works with 240
simple operations given the first 24 bits of 235 frames. Compared with all existing
attacks [15, 11, 7–9] against two-level Bluetooth E0, this is the best one so far, al-
though the impossibly high amount of frames thwarts our attack to be practical. It
remains an open challenge to decrease the data complexity with practical time and
memory complexities. Finally, our attack illustrates the theory of statistical attacks
in [2, 16] with an example which is not based on linear cryptanalysis.
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Appendix
All our analysis here is similar with [16] and inspired by [2]. First, by Eq.(13), we
have
Exp(GK′) =
16m
2τ
∑
b
f(b)
for a random wrong guess K ′, and by Eq.(11) we have
Exp(GK) =
15m
2τ
∑
b
f(b) + m
∑
b
D′(b)f(b),
for the right K. Hence,
∆Exp(GK′ ) = m
∑
b
(
D′(b)− 1
2τ
)
f(b). (15)
Meanwhile, we compute the variance of GK′ as
Var(GK′) =
16m
2τ
∑
b
(f(b))
2 − 16m
22τ
(∑
b
f(b)
)2
. (16)
We can estimate the rank of GK over all possible GK′ by
Exp(RankGK ) ≈ 24(2+τ)Φ
(
− ∆Exp(GK′)√
2Var(GK′)
)
. (17)
In order to achieve the top rank for GK , we see that the fraction
∆Exp(GK′)√
Var(GK′)
(18)
must be large enough. This can be satisfied as long as the number m of available
frames is sufficiently large. However, aiming at a practical attack, we are concerned
with the question of how to choose f in order to minimize m under the constraint
of the top rank GK . In order to maximize the fraction (18), we first maximize the
numerator with the constraint that the denominator is a constant and then try to
maximize the fraction over all the solutions. Define the multivariate polynomial
gf = m
∑
b
(
D′(b)− 1
2τ
)
f(b) +
16mγ
2τ
∑
b
(f(b))
2 − 16mγ
22τ
(∑
b
f(b)
)2
.
Using Lagrange’s multiplier, we have
∂gf
∂f(b)
= m
(
D′(b)− 1
2τ
)
+
32mγ
2τ
f(b)− 32mγ
22τ
∑
b′
f(b′) = 0, (19)
for all b ∈ GF (2)τ . From Eq.(19) we infer that
f(b)− f(b′)
D′(b)−D′(b′) = const.
for all b 6= b′. Therefore we have a universal expression of f as
f(b)− const.
D′(b) = const
′.
for all b ∈ GF (2)τ , which yields the same quantity of (18) regardless of the constants
in f . So the easiest way to define f could be f(b) = D′(b)− 12τ for all b ∈ GF (2)τ .
Then Eq.(15) reduces to
∆Exp(GK′) = m
∑
b
(
D′(b)− 1
2τ
)2
=
m
2τ
∑
b6=0
(
Dˆ(b)
)8
≈ m
2τ
(2τ − 1)λ8.
On the other hand Eq.(16) reduces to
Var(GK′) ≈ 16m
22τ
(2τ − 1)λ8.
So we deduce from Eq.(17) that
Exp(RankGK ) ≈ 24(2+τ)Φ
(
−λ
4
4
√
m(2τ − 1)
2
)
≈ 2
4(2+τ)
√
2pi
e−
m(2τ−1)
64 λ
8
.
This means RankGK is expected to top the chart with
m ≈ 256(2 + τ) log 2
λ8(2τ − 1) ≈
τ + 2
2τ − 1 · 2
34.5.
